

TOKYO GAZETTE

A MONTHLY REPORT OF CURRENT POLICIES,
OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND STATISTICS

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PREPARING OURSELVES FOR THE EMERGENCY

—An Address Delivered at the Initial Meeting of the Movement for National Spiritual Mobilization—

PRINCE AYAMARO KONO, PRIME MINISTER

AT this, the initiation of the Movement for National Spiritual Mobilization, I wish to call upon all members of the Japanese nation for their whole-hearted cooperation. To this end I lay before you my heart and my convictions.

The North China incident has developed into the China affair, as all of you know, because of the insincerity of the Chinese Government in ignoring the policy and endeavours of our Government which were directed against the aggravation of hostilities. This attitude of ignoring the true facts has called for punitive measures of a comprehensive and positive nature. It is unnecessary to remind you that the ultimate purpose of the Japanese Government has been to bring together the three nations, Japan, Manchoukuo, and China, which have a common cultural heritage—the culture of the Orient—to collaborate in the work of ensuring stability in our part of the world, so that on that firm foundation we may strive autonomously for the establishment of world peace. In fact, our Government has long adhered diligently and consistently to this purpose. It is a truism to state that the real happiness of the peoples in the Orient will be realized only when peace is established in this part of the world. Hence it is our conviction that the task of nation building in China will never be successful unless it is performed on the basis of friendly cooperation between the two great neighbouring countries of the East, Japan and China. We are likewise convinced that such a nationalism as is founded upon anti-Japanism certainly drives the Chinese away from happiness. Yet in this connection it must be realized that the anti-Japanese education conducted by the Chinese Government has a background of years of manipulation; deep-rooted popular feelings have been fostered by it.

As matters now stand, it is but natural that patience on the part of Japanese should have the contrary effect of inviting Chinese contempt and reinforcing their attitude of resistance against us. In their unrest they have gone so far as to place, as we are now

witnessing, their entire nation at the mercy of the ominous Red menace. Their young people, brought up through anti-Japanese education, are in reality digging the ground from under their own feet ; the innocent masses, on the other hand, who have been immune to that disastrous education are in tragic circumstances, finding no medium ground between two hostile forces.

"A Permanent Structure of Peace in the Orient"

Under these circumstances it is imperative not only for the security of our country but also for the cause of righteousness and humanity, and for the future of the Orient in particular, that we deal a decisive blow to the Government of China, so that the source of all anti-Japanese forces in China may be shattered. Through the lesson thus inculcated, the will to fight on the part of China must be brought to an end. Yet this is not all. We must simultaneously proceed with the task of setting up a permanent structure of peace in the Orient in collaboration with all the constructive forces in China which will be liberated by our present action. This is a task which is justified both in the sight of God and man. It is indeed a task which, if not performed today, will have to be undertaken by future generations under far greater difficulties. It is therefore our honour to be called upon to accomplish this historic work placed before the Japanese people. With joy should we respond to the call.

If the assumption is made that this significant historic task is one that can be undertaken without any difficulties, to my mind simply an irrational conception is being maintained. We must be prepared hereafter for manifold difficulties arising in all phases of our national life. What is immediately essential, therefore, is the determination to stand firm, unshaken, and to persevere in the face of national crises of whatever nature, until our ultimate purpose is achieved. Needless to say, such an essential cannot be effected by a Government or a fighting service alone.

"The Mission with which Our Generation is Charged"

All the constructive forces of the nation should be synthesized, accumulated, and mobilized for the highest national cause. Whether we bear arms, or follow the plough, or keep books, we are each an indispensable unit in the nation's struggle. Our presence or absence, work or rest mean so much gain or loss in national strength. Such should be our realization of the important parts we play in national mobilization. With this faith in ourselves and in the infinite pos-

sibilities of this great movement, let us advance in performing the mission with which our generation is charged. A new epoch will certainly be marked in the development of Japan. My confidence in this regard is not groundless; it rests definitely on the following two considerations.

I refer first to the fact that Japan, although one of the oldest countries in the world, is full of vitality like a youth—a fact concerning which the opinions of all fair-minded observers of present-day Japan are united.

“Our Fathers Have Left Us a Legacy”

Our fathers have left us a legacy in terms of prosperous national existence as we find it today, by confronting and overcoming many serious difficulties. If Japan is to continue her development, certain friction will arise in her relations with the outside world. She cannot be exempted from this law of nature. The present affair is but a phase of international friction which is inevitably to be encountered in the course of Japan's growth and expansion. Hence, it is incumbent upon us to settle this matter in our own times, so that we may leave to future generations the realization of Sino-Japanese collaboration as our legacy to them.

The second consideration is based on our conviction that Japan is playing a leading role as a progressive nation in the modern world, a conviction that is justified not only from the subjective viewpoint of Japan herself, but from the broad viewpoint of world history. The world today, West as well as East, is in the midst of uncertainty and unrest. The underlying cause lies in the fact that international justice is not being realized in substantial terms. The present action of Japan might be construed in a totally different light through the superficial conceptions of those having ulterior motives. But this action is essentially an expression of our firm stand for international justice in its true sense, a justice which is in keeping with the main current of world history. What we stand for will thus appeal, in no small measure, to the minds of progressive peoples other than our own.

“Nothing Whatsoever to Fear”

When the entire nation rests on such a conviction, and becomes united in one body, with every individual offering himself for the highest national cause, there will be nothing whatsoever to fear in the future of our country. What is inherent and genuine in the national life of Japan is best manifested in time of emergency when

all members of the entire nation, without exception through different social strata and classes, offer themselves as one man to the State. This national character was actually witnessed at the 72nd session of the Imperial Diet, when the budget, gigantic in amount, was unanimously approved in a moment by both Houses. Such a fact is not only unrivalled in but also beyond the comprehension of any country other than Japan. In particular, to the Chinese Government which has made an anticipated internal division in Japan the grounds for forcing its anti-Japanese measures, it must have been an unexpected spiritual blow.

"I Cannot But Feel Grateful"

As for me, I cannot but feel grateful for the whole-hearted cooperation of the nation with regard to the present affair. When, however, I think of the fact that the realization of such a state of complete unity and cooperation is possible because of the historic structure of our national polity which is of the highest dignity, I am awakened once again to the grace of being permitted to live as a Japanese subject.

The conception that the State is not a promiscuous association for purposes of profit, but a community having a definite cultural mission, while the subject is not a profit-seeking materialistic entity but a spiritual entity whose purpose is to make certain contributions to humanity through the structure of a nation-State, is attracting serious attention today among thinking people who are not satisfied with the materialistic aspects of Western culture. We in Japan are certainly witnessing a rising tide of such a conception and a strong desire for its realization. This conception is inherently materialized in the national structure of Japan which orientates itself around the Throne occupied by a single dynasty from time immemorial. When, therefore, our consciousness of this definite fact about our State has been intensified, national spiritual mobilization will be achieved of its own accord.

"We Have Heard the Command"

As all of you know, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, upon the outbreak of the incident in North China, immediately returned to Tokyo from Hayama; and since then has been giving His time and energy, day and night, to the affairs of State with reference to the present crisis. Whenever I was granted an audience, I was filled with awe and deeply moved in seeing His Majesty working so industriously. We have heard the following command in the

Imperial Message granted on the occasion of the opening of the Imperial Diet on September 4th:

It is Our wish, in view of the present extraordinary situation, that Our subjects, united in their faithful service to the State and in their devotion to the Throne, will seek to achieve the purpose of the Empire.

In conformance with the Imperial Command, our compatriots in the services are performing their duty loyally and courageously at the front. In the same way, the people at large should do their share in consolidating life and activities behind the lines. It is thus that we may conform to the Imperial Command.

The world is now at a great turning point. In this fateful moment of human history, Japan is called upon to perform the significant mission of bringing together the moral principles of the East and the civilization of the West in perfect synthesis and harmony, thereby making an essential contribution to the creation of a new world. The advance of the Japanese nation, with her infinite possibilities, has already begun. I earnestly hope, therefore, that every one of us, both of the Government and of the people, will unite in making the purpose of the State his own and cooperate in undertaking this momentous and glorious task.

ON PUBLICITY AND INFORMATION

BUREAU OF INFORMATION, PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT

I

ACCURATE information on internal and external affairs to ensure enlightened understanding of them constitutes an essential instrument whereby a modern government can frame and execute concrete and consistent national policies. In fact, on the basis of such information and knowledge alone can good government and wise diplomacy be established, invincible national defence perfected, and real national policies formed and carried out.

Not infrequently, however, useless, incorrect, and exaggerated news and reports are to be found among different kinds of information. Inaccurate information may arise from superficial observation and incomplete judgement, in other words from inadequate understanding of the actual situation; also distorted information may be exaggerated from certain ulterior motives. Hence it is necessary that information activities should go beyond the mere collection of news and reports. Collected information, before turned to account, should be carefully studied as to the accuracy of individual cases, and from the synthesized point of view of national purposes.

The significance of publicity in the formation and execution of policies should not be minimized. Its importance is by no means confined to external use, but is applicable to internal affairs as well. "The people should be kept in ignorance and led to trust the Government," is consonant to the feudal idea of government. The modern ideal may be expressed, "The people should be enlightened and led to trust the Government." The foundation of modern government consists largely in eliminating feelings of restraint upon the people's minds and in listening to sane public opinion.

It therefore becomes requisite for the Japanese Government to make its policies correctly and widely known, seeking their thorough understanding by the nation. A government which does not reflect public opinion belongs to the self-righteous type of government, and as such it will prove, with all its merits and virtues, to be inefficient and ineffective, always weakened by the sense of uncertainty and the lack of interest on the part of the people. Herein lies another cause for emphasizing the importance of a

positive publicity policy. Such a policy enables the nation to keep fully and unerringly informed on national purposes and policies, and to foster sound public opinion. An additional function of publicity work is to promote good understanding with other countries by informing them of the real intentions of this country and by reflecting public opinion with regard to its relations with them.

II

The basic purpose of internal publicity in Japan is to unite all members of the nation in one spirit and promote the consolidation of their spiritual life. Hence the publicity policies of the State invariably contain within them elements of general educational and cultural work and of spiritual consolidation. With regard to external publicity also, information along the lines of culture and of scenic attractions has no less vital significance, as endeavours to represent the country abroad in its cultural, industrial and other essential aspects—in other words, to represent the country truly and fully—form the fundamental and indispensable step for creating mutual understanding between nations and realizing, on that foundation, international cooperation in essential terms.

Since information and publicity grow in importance as instruments for achieving national purposes, many countries have naturally set up organizations to make a special study of them and to control their execution. In Japan, too, the Bureau of Information has been established in the Department of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of efficiently carrying out her foreign policies, while the Press Section of the War Department and the Publicity Bureau of the Navy Department have been organized for their respective publicity purposes. The existence, on the other hand, of the Bureau of Cultural Works in the Department of Foreign Affairs and of the Board of Tourist Industry is meeting the needs of publicity in these respective fields. All these institutions, useful as they are, are limited, by their individual natures, in scope, function, and viewpoint. Under these circumstances, the creation of a permanent institution designed to establish and control information and publicity measures from the synthesized viewpoint of national policy came to be urgently called for. This resulted in the setting up, in July, 1936, of an institution entitled the Commission of Information in the Prime Minister's Department.

III

The organization of the Commission was roughly as follows :

under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, Vice-Ministers of various Departments as well as Chiefs of the Bureaus and Sections having close associations with information work were appointed as commissioners. Besides this Board of Commissioners a sort of Secretariate was set up, having permanent secretaries and a clerical staff—an organization unexampled in other governmental commissions. The genius of the institution, however, lay in the arrangement whereby secretaries of those Departments in close association with this important work were ordered to give the main part of their time to sharing responsibilities with the members of the Secretariate, thus effecting connections between Departments and Bureaus in respect to the work of information and publicity and ensuring its control. Thus the Commission of Information, with its regularly staffed Secretariate, constituted a Bureau in substance. Any claim to uniqueness must be based on the fact that the Commission was in the nature of an institution operated not by a Department or Departments but by the whole of the Government.

IV

Yet this useful governmental institution, efficient as it had been, was found, within the experience of a single year, inadequate in organization to enable it to give full scope to its functions. It was therefore thought expedient that the Secretariate be enlarged and strengthened. Accordingly, the former system in which the Secretariate was attached to the Board of Commissioners has now been reorganized, and not the Board but the Secretariate has now become the centre of operation. The ideal, however, of uniting as one body the two divisions, the Secretariate and the Board of Commissioners, has been maintained.

Essential points to be noted in the new system are, in the first place, its new name and augmented staff. The name, Commission of Information, has been superseded by that of Bureau of Information, Prime Minister's Department. Under the Chief of the Bureau, the latter now has a fair number of secretaries and clerks as in the cases of other regular governmental Bureaus. In order to respect and maintain, as has been explained, the nature of an institution operated by the whole of the Government, a body of commissioners consisting of Vice-Ministers of Departments, and Bureau and Section Chiefs having close connection with information work, has been appointed to participate, under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, in the affairs of the Bureau. This body corresponds to the Board of Commissioners in the former

system. In the new system, too, connections between various Departments have been given special attention, and each Department has appointed a liaison officer from among its officials. These liaison officers are to share responsibilities in taking charge of the activities of the Bureau along the lines of information, supplying of news, education and publicity. Among them, furthermore, are a few who are ordered to give the main part of their time to the Bureau, functioning in effecting connections and adjustments between various Departments in respect to informative affairs, in harmonious collaboration with the full-time members of the staff.

The second point of importance is found in the definition and detailed classification of the functions of the Bureau as well as their enlargement. These were formerly defined simply : "To effect coordination between the important affairs of various governmental institutions in respect to information." Under the new system, they have been enlarged and defined as follows :

1. To effect coordination between the affairs of various governmental institutions in respect to information as the basis for the execution of national policies.
2. To effect coordination between the affairs of various governmental institutions in respect to the supplying of internal and external news.
3. To effect coordination between the affairs of various governmental institutions in respect to enlightenment and publicity.
4. To engage in the collection of information, the supplying of news, and in activities for enlightenment and publicity with regard to matters which do not come under the functions of other governmental institutions.

The last provision authorizes the new Bureau to function, to a certain extent, in collecting information, giving out news material, and engaging in enlightenment and publicity, going beyond the function of merely effecting coordination. In this respect, the new Bureau has certainly made great advance in its duties as an institution for information and publicity. It is also provided that the Bureau, for safeguarding the efficient and perfect execution of its functions, may require of the Departments and Bureaus concerned to present information and other material as well as to give explanations.

The third noteworthy point concerning the Bureau of Information is the creation of the office of adviser. This step has been taken under the consideration that national measures such as information, supplying of news, enlightenment, and publicity should not be directed and executed by government officials alone, but that

the work should be shared by leaders of the people, realizing thereby the ideal of being conducted by the nation as a whole. Accordingly, such leaders having expert knowledge and experience along the same lines, ten in number, have been appointed as advisers. They are all authorities in the fields of newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasting, theatre arts, motion pictures and of other information and publicity activities, and are regarded as representative leaders in their respective fields. Their term of office is for two years. By making the most of this system of advisers the Bureau will, in reality, prove to be an institution operated by the nation as a whole. Great results, therefore, are anticipated for the Bureau of Information.

The present reorganization, as has been made clear, has been to augment the scope and functions of the previous Commission. The fact that this expansive step has been taken in the very midst of the China affair, at a time when the work of information and publicity has become increasingly momentous is, in itself, highly significant. All staff members of the Bureau are striving to perform their duty in giving full scope to the important functions of this new institution, which is designed to collect accurate information as the basis for executing national policies, to give out news as the means of clarifying the real intentions of the Japanese Empire at home and abroad, and further to promote education and public relations appropriate to the present emergency.

FUNCTIONS OF FORESTS IN JAPAN

BUREAU OF FORESTRY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

I

VARIOUS natural disasters, recurring frequently in recent years, have wrought havoc on many occasions in Japan, and have menaced lives and livelihoods, particularly in rural communities. The principal calamities have been floods, droughts, storms, chilling winds, avalanches, earthquakes, tidal waves, forest fires, sand storms and landslides.

Indubitably, the immediate causes of such disasters lie in the power and might of nature. Yet, one of the essential tasks of a civilized nation is to study scientifically the methods of alleviating and preventing natural calamities, and to adopt these methods systematically. The cultural progress of a nation may, to some degree, be measured by the steps taken to counteract the influences of topographical, geological, and meteorological peculiarities. Specifically, great attention must be paid to the fact that causes of floods and droughts lie in the devastation of forests ; because of the reckless felling of woods along sea shores, people have suffered unnecessarily intense damage from sand storms and terrific winds. Such disasters cannot be termed natural ; they are artificial.

II

For the prevention and alleviation of these disasters, it is, of course, necessary to undertake public works, to organize vigilance corps, and to study other measures from various angles. However, in many cases it is considered best to create appropriate forests at necessary sites, so that the forests may fulfil their function of protecting the country.

Afforestation as the means of alleviating and preventing natural disasters is not a new thing. It is clearly recorded in Japanese history that ordinances proscribing the devastation of forests, in order to develop river sources and to prevent floods, were promulgated more than a thousand years ago. Other examples of public works which were created in ancient times and conserved for lessening the ravages of nature, still remain. Recently, numerous scientific surveys and investigations have been conducted with

respect to features of forests and varieties of trees, while new forests have been created and existing forests have been improved on the basis of this scientific research.

Forests and Floods

During the twelve-year period from 1924 to 1935, floods affected practically all districts in Japan proper; damages caused by them averaged 120 million yen annually, separate from loss of life, other intangible losses and indirect damages which rendered more serious blows to the nation than the monetary losses.

Japan is known as a rainy country. Especially is it subject to frequent visitations by typhoons which bring with them heavy downpours. Moreover, the lie of the land in the mountainous regions, which constitute over one-half of the entire area of the country, is steep and the geological formation is generally frail. Accordingly, rain waters are suddenly transformed into torrents likely to cause landslides. But despite these meteorological and topographical disadvantages, Japan is unsurpassed in point of the dimensions of paddy (rice) fields, and in the effective utilization of irrigation facilities for both paddy fields and farmers' cottages which are situated along river banks.

"To rule the rivers is to rule the mountains." As is implied in this old Japanese saying, mountain conditions are closely related to those of rivers. Primarily, floods are caused by increased water in rivers due to heavy downpours, long spells of rainy weather and large snow thaws; defects in embankments, lack of water-preventing forests and other such facilities for protection against overflows of river water; elevated river beds which hinder drainage and cause overflowing and destruction of river banks; and silt washed down in great quantities together with rain water from devastated mountains which raises the water level of rivers. Frequently, in the case of the river, whose source is devastated, flow of soil and sand reaches the same proportion as water in time of floods. This means that the devastation of the river source is liable to double the flood level.

If rich forests are conserved at the river source, however, the roots of trees consolidate both soil and sand and will prevent landslides. Moreover, the accumulation of fallen leaves and mosses protect the soil from being washed away. These elements naturally check rise in the flood level. If the flow of soil and sand from mountains is limited, river beds are reduced to a certain extent by increased flow of water, so that drainage becomes accelerated.

Again, if rich forests are developed at river sources, fallen leaves, mosses and decayed leaves absorb rain in some quantities and lessen the flow of water; and moreover, rain waters that flow underneath the accumulated covering are prevented from forming rapid currents, and their confluence with river water is much slower than that of water from other districts. A person passing through a forest during a heavy rain or immediately following a long period of rainy weather often comes across numerous pools of water, and even on the slopes of such forests he will quite often be obliged to step knee-deep into softened soil as if in a marsh or paddy field. No such experience can be had on barren mountains where soil and stones are washed away by downpours before the rain water is pooled.

Thus, forests control and mitigate increased flow of water from the mountains and keep it clear. Yet, if the mountains are devastated to such an extent that rapid currents of muddy water rush down, sharp increases are caused in river water. Moreover, large rocks and stones are washed away into the river which destroy embankments and bridges. Bamboo or other appropriate protective afforestation in front and behind river embankments prevent the violent rush of mad waters and protect the embankments. Such forests sometimes take the place of embankments themselves. Thick forests occupying proper positions, with the trunks and branches of their trees, check the rushing force of soil and sand as well as the currents of muddy water, or change the direction of their movements. As a consequence, the extent of damage from floods is appreciably reduced.

Tremendous expenses are required for river improvement work, and if the river source is devastated, such expensive repairs will have to be repeated regularly, sometimes within a few years or within a decade. Because of this fact each river improvement enterprise is said to have its age limit. However, comparatively smaller expenditures are required for the improvement of river sources, and the function of forests in controlling rivers increases as years pass, while enriched forests, under proper management, will supply lumber and other silvan products for daily necessities without harming their function of ruling rivers. Forests also play important roles in affording scenic beauty and providing sanitation.

Forests and Droughts

The quantity of precipitation is large in Japan. The long spell of wet weather which usually extends from June to July is known

as "tsuyu" or "bai-u", the latter meaning "plum rain" as it occurs when plums are ripening. Other heavy rainfalls take place with the typhoons of August and September. However, there are many regions where rainfall is meagre during winter and succeeding months until the rice planting season in May. In these districts, considerable difficulties are regularly encountered in planting rice. Again, rain often fails to fall even during the early summer rainy season, causing huge contractions in crops even of dry farms. The long drought which took place in the *Kinki*, *Sanyo*, *Shikoku* and *Kyushu* districts in 1934 was so severe that the damage inflicted on farm crops alone reached 140 million yen. Indeed, drought causes far more serious damage in Japan where paddy fields form the principal extent of farms, than in European and American countries.

As mentioned in connection with floods, forests adjust the flow of river water. It is also known that snow in dense forests on high mountainous zones melts much later than that in waste lands, while the water from the former flows gradually into rivers. Snow water from forest districts, therefore, alleviates in considerable measure the effect of droughts.

On the other hand, some entertain the view that forests cause the exhaustion of river sources, on the theory that trees absorb through their roots water from underground and emit it through their leaves, thus causing soil to dry. This view may be justifiable to a certain extent, but it proves true only in cases of peculiar lands situated on hills in regions where rainfall is very limited or in pine forests located in shallow valleys and other similar places. Forests in high mountainous zones rather increase rainfall, and in any case the quantity of water emitted from tree leaves is inconsiderable. It cannot be denied that dense forests in mountains and valleys generally have vast power to enrich river sources.

Accurate observations both in Japan and in Western countries conspicuously reveal that, although the presence of forests does not affect greatly the annual total water flow, the quantity of water flowing from forest zones shows no sharp variations throughout the year, whereas that from barren zones is subject to drastic and sudden increases after heavy rainfalls and to sharp decreases in case of a few days of dry weather. Constancy in the flow of a river throughout the year is most desirable for hydrolic electricity generation and for other devices in the utilization of river water. Abundant supply of river water in May and June is also most important for rice planting. It is because of this fact that the function of forests to conserve river sources is considered especially valuable in Japan.

Forests and Storms

Japan is menaced by the occasional visitations of cyclones caused by atmospheric depressions generating in Siberia during the winter, and also by the coming of typhoons due to atmospheric depressions occurring in the South Seas during the autumn. Both these winds are renowned for their terrific nature. The cyclones are accompanied by snow storms, paralyzing transportation facilities in the northern part of Japan several times each year. Typhoons are accompanied by heavy rains, causing floods in addition to the immediate damage of the winds themselves.

The function of forests in obstructing storms and reducing their destructive force is also considerably important. Dense groves consisting of large trees, effectively protect against storms the adjoining lands to the distance of about twenty times the heights of the trees. A wind-belt of woods not merely restrains the destructive force of storms; it affords continual protection to vegetables and agricultural crops from the chronic if invisible evil effects of winds both strong and weak. In winter, a wind-belt of woods obstructs the snow storm, prevents the accumulation of snow in one place, and protects railway and other transportation facilities. Woods on the site of a shrine or temple or surrounding a residence enhance Japan's scenic beauty and protect the buildings against fire. In Tokyo and its vicinity, strong winds prevail in the spring of each year, raising clouds of dust, which winds, in olden times, caused many fires in the city. Naturally, large trees were planted around the mansions of feudal lords and other large residences which still remain in the form of hedges of aged trees, such as *pasania* and oak. This is an example of the effective utilization of trees in Japan for protection against wind and fire and for artistic purposes.

Chilling Winds

In the northern part of Japan, especially Aomori and Iwate prefectures, winds of low temperatures and excessive moisture, known as "Yamase", prevail for long periods extending from and beyond the rice planting season. This peculiar type of wind causes a sharp fall in temperature throughout the region. The moisture brought with it develops into fog so thick as to hamper the direct rays of the sun in reaching plants, and often exerts considerable damage on rice crops. Rice crop failures which have taken place in the northern districts of Japan continuously during recent years have been due to this "Yamase" wind.

Here, again, forests can be utilized for the protection of farm crops. In Aomori prefecture, where farmers have suffered continued crop failures because of the chilling winds, many cases exist where harvests were normal on farms protected by wind-belts of woods. Another outstanding example is to be found in Hokkaido. In the Yubari district of Hokkaido, crops of soy beans, red beans, oats and rape-seed have increased by 60 per cent in recent years, for which credit must be given to the wind-belts formed by trees.

Forests and Avalanches

In 1934, 1935 and 1936, avalanches occurred quite often in the the Hokuriku and Tohoku (northern) districts. They crushed trees, caused landslides, washed soil and sand into rivers, destroyed dwelling houses, roads and railways, and also caused loss of life. The lamentable picture of conditions in the affected districts may be seen in the forests which remain devastated today. The northern half of Japan is subject to less damage by droughts in comparison with the southern half, but damage caused by avalanches is not less in degree than that caused by droughts. The worst feature of the former is that once the snowslides take place, they recur at the same spots almost every subsequent year, and their dimensions are liable to expand year after year.

To check avalanches in which entire layers of snow slide down steep slopes, it is essential to increase obstacles on the surface of the land. The sliding of an entire layer of snow occurs on steep slopes which are either covered only by *misanthus* or *sasa albo-marginata* or are totally exposed. Such an avalanche never takes place in dense woods even on steep slopes. It is also true that the sliding of upper layers of snow which takes place on frozen surfaces of snow, can be stopped by the strong trunks and branches of trees in dense woods. In regions where snow becomes several feet deep, the unevenness of land, steps and various other snow stopping devices are likely to be entirely covered by snow, and thus fail to check effectively slides of top layers. However, dense woods consisting of trees about 20 feet high work perfectly in preventing such calamities. Accordingly, no avalanche can take place in forests of large trees.

Earthquakes

That severe earthquakes destroy houses and buildings, and cause conflagrations and loss of life are well known. Yet few people realize that damage caused by earthquakes on mountains and rivers is often greater than that done to buildings. Earthquakes cause

numerous landslides ; the soil and sand shaken down from the affected spots to rivers cause floods. At the time of the great earthquake of 1923 in the Tokyo and Yokohama district, huge landslides were caused simultaneously in Kanagawa and seven neighbouring prefectures, the dimensions of which aggregated approximately 6,000 chobu (one chobu equals 2.45 acres), and which later resulted in severe inundations. The disaster was particularly severe at Oyama-cho in Kanagawa prefecture, which was a part of the centre of the seismic disturbance. In that town, no person was killed and only a few houses were destroyed by the earthquake itself, but landslides occurred at numerous points. A few days later there were heavy rainfalls ; the areas of the landslides expanded ; both soil and sand were suddenly washed down to the Oyama river, and great floods ensued, which either destroyed or washed away most houses located in the town's busiest portion along the river banks. Casualties were heavy. In fact, the damage caused by the landslides was several hundred times greater than that caused directly by the earthquake.

It is a conspicuous phenomenon that earthquakes cause horrible landslides on steep mountain slopes, but these can be prevented or restricted in considerable measure by forests. In most cases, the shallow layers of soil which form the surfaces of mountains are subject to landslides caused by earthquakes. Well-tangled roots of trees have great power to prevent this sliding of the surface layers of land, exactly as in the case of prevention of landslides in dense forests during times of heavy rainfall. The great disaster of 1923 caused landslides at many points in the Tanzawa mountains in Kanagawa prefecture, but no slides occurred in the portions of the mountains densely covered with aged trees, while the adjoining parts with only young trees or no trees whatsoever suffered serious damage. Landslides took place over practically all the latter portion, in spite of the fact that its geological formation was exactly similar to that of the former.

Forests and Tidal Waves

Tidal waves usually follow earthquakes but they sometimes occur, on small scale, because of storms. It is inevitable that tidal waves should occur frequently in Japan in view of the great frequency of earthquakes and of storms, since this country is surrounded by seas. The seismic tidal waves off the coast of the north-eastern part of Japan proper in 1933, the storm tidal waves which took place in Kochi, Tokushima, and Wakayama prefectures, and the Osaka-Kobe district in 1934, and those recurring with considerable frequency in

Okinawa prefecture during the past few years are the most notable among recent cases. Generally speaking seismic tidal waves occur in the north-eastern part of Japan proper and other parts of the Pacific coast of Japan periodically every 30 to 100 years, while each year invariably witnesses storm tidal waves in some region. In some years these recur several times in the same region. The destructive force of tidal waves operates with much greater severity against inelastic substances such as embankments or break-waters than against trees and such other elastic bulwarks. Tidal waves merely bend or shake trees, seldom uprooting them. And when the dimensions of densely wooded areas are fairly large, tidal waves lose their energy in great measure while engaging the trees, whereby their destructive force is finally exhausted. It has often been proved that even such severe tidal waves as occur in the north-eastern part of Japan proper lose their destructive force as they go through dense woods consisting of large trees and extending in width over 600 feet. The once terrific waves are subdued merely to calm inundations in the zone behind the woods, lose their advancing power and finally retreat without reaching farm lands and houses. Comparatively small expense is required for the establishment of a belt of woods against tidal waves, and in ordinary times such woods work as a wind-belt or as an agency to attract schools of fish and to enhance the scenic beauty of their locality.

Forest Fires

Due to meteorological conditions, forest fires occur in Japan with unusual frequency. Indeed, among civilized countries, the United States alone surpasses Japan in point of dimensions of forest fires. Areas affected by forest fires in such countries as Germany, Austria, France and Great Britain annually fail to reach even 10 per cent of those in Japan. Forest fires not only bring economic losses to owners of forests, but also affect scenic beauty and cause exhaustion of river sources and irremediable losses to public interests.

A forest fire usually starts in a waste land or in a grove of young trees, then advances, sometimes, to devastate entire forests of fine old growths. However, many kinds of trees possess the anti-combustible quality. The *pasania* and oak which are usually found on the sites of shrines and temples as well as near large mansions in the Tokyo district, the "sangoju" (coral tree) which is called dialectically the "hifusegi" or fire-preventing tree and which is used for hedges in towns and villages on the Boso peninsula (Chiba prefecture) and on the Miura peninsula (Kanagawa prefecture) are the outstanding examples. Not rarely, it occurs that a raging forest fire which started

on dry leaves quietly dies down when it reaches a zone densely wooded by such trees as *aucuba japonica* shrub and *daphniphyllum macropodum*. Dense groves of deciduous pines are not easily affected by fire, and a fire seldom starts in such woods. It is appropriate to utilize the characteristics of these trees for the prevention and restriction of forest fires and also for the protection against conflagration of wooden buildings in cities.

Sand Storms

Being surrounded by seas Japan has sandy beaches at many places, some of them exceeding three miles in width and several tens of miles in length. Sometimes, sand from these beaches is blown high into the air, to settle within limited areas, forming tremendous dunes several hundred feet high. These sand dunes are occasionally blown inland, burying farms, blockading mouths of rivers, filling ports and harbours and hindering the operation of transportation facilities. Sand storms at times bury irrigation constructions and even dwelling houses. Sand storms are especially severe on the Japan Sea coast during winter, where fierce winds sweep up great quantities of sand filling the sky, and later transforming wide areas of fertile land into deserts within short spaces of time.

Forests, obviously, afford the best means of preventing sand storms along sea shores yet young trees planted on sandy land with considerable difficulty are likely to be covered with sand in the space of a single winter, or to be killed by the terrific heat emanating from the sand during a dry summer season. And trees which have survived for several years are sometimes totally destroyed by waves during storms. Due consideration must therefore be given to these possibilities and adequate protection must be set up for young trees planted on sea shores, in order to develop the young plants into vast groves. This is not at all an easy undertaking. Costs for creating woods on sea shores are generally four to ten times as large as those for similar undertakings in mountains.

However, it must be realized that such undertakings will transform sandy waste lands into beautiful forests of green pine trees which, in fitting contrast to white sandy beaches, will provide beauty while protecting the regions from sand storms. They will also protect inland districts and inhabitants from winds and waves, and naturally bring prosperity to their regions. On the sea coast of the northern part of Japan proper, there are many villages effectively protected from sand storms by woods which were established through the strenuous endeavours of the ancestors of present inhabitants; there

are several village shrines which are sacred to the spirits of these enterprising ancestors.

Landslides and Forests

In Japan proper, especially in north-eastern regions, are a considerable number of farms and residential sites which are constantly being shifted because of landslides. The frequent recurrence of these disasters is attributable, in part, to the peculiar geological formation of the country. Yet it is undeniable that they are caused on many occasions by artificial agencies, such as the development of paddy fields on steep, mountain slopes and the construction of crude water reservoirs. In districts where landslides prevail, walls of houses fall, foundations weaken, and doors and windows become unfastenable unless major renovations are effected several times a year. In the case of rice fields, planting becomes impossible until extensive repair work is carried out. On many occasions, repairing becomes impossible; entire farms are abandoned. In certain districts, roads and water services are destroyed with such frequency that the inhabitants of the affected areas exhaust themselves in repeating temporary rehabilitation works.

Undoubtedly neither forests nor public works are effective in preventing landslides which occur on very deep layers of soil. However, a shallow landslide may be checked effectively by forests alone or by the help of public works. Dense forests cultivated with trees of the *zeikova acuminata*, *quercus serrata* and *quercus glandulifera* are particularly valuable in the prevention of slides, because these trees attain enormous size and extend their strong roots deep into the ground.

III

In addition to the functions of forests which have been outlined here, forests contribute to many other phases of national life. Certain groves attract schools of fish and increase catches in some regions. Forests add to scenic beauty; they promote the health of the people; in these ways they make spiritual contributions to the nation.

A forest which is developed for protection against one kind of natural calamity, always works toward the prevention or alleviation of damages caused by other disasters. From a practical viewpoint, they supply silvan products which are necessary as raw materials in the rayon, paper, pure alcohol, and other chemical industries. By utilizing the products of forests, business enterprises flourish; many people receive remuneration from them. The Department of Agriculture and Forestry firmly believes that forests and their development contribute materially to the welfare of the Japanese nation.

THE SITUATION IN CHINA

I

—Advance of the Imperial Army—

PRESS SECTION, WAR DEPARTMENT

The Shanghai Front

(From August 28th to October 6th)

THE Nagatsu and Wachi detachments which landed on the estuary of the Yangtze succeeded in capturing the district near Lotienchen at noon, August 28th.

On September 5th, part of these detachments encircled 1,000 troops belonging to the 31st regiment of the Chinese 51st division at Yangchialou and Choutze about 2 kilometres north-west of Lotienchen and overcame them. In the engagement the Japanese captured several guns.

The Asama detachment reduced Lion's Forest Forts at 5 p.m., September 1st. At 10 o'clock, the following morning, the detachment advanced to a district south of the Forts. At noon, September 3rd, this unit occupied Kuchiatze and, in cooperation with the Takamori detachment advancing from the south, hemmed in the Chinese troops at Paoshan and the district west of it.

The Takamori detachment which landed at a point north of Woosungchen advanced to a line connecting the southern extremity of Woosung Fort, Paochiachuang, Wingchiatze and Tachinchiatsun on the evening of September 1st. This detachment succeeded in taking Woosung Fort at 9:30 o'clock, the following morning. On the evening of September 3rd, the detachment advanced to a line connecting the southern side of Paoshan, Tsaochiapin, Yin-chiatze and Ssutang Creek, where, at 4 o'clock the following afternoon, it launched an offensive against the enemy who had taken up positions along a line connecting Paoshan, Tsaochiashang, Chin-chiatze and the right bank of Ssutang Creek. The enemy offered stiff resistance, taking advantage of the walls of Paoshan and the creek. Fierce fighting continued till night when part of the enemy staged a counter-attack which was repulsed by the Japanese.

Meanwhile the Japanese had completely enveloped Paoshan.

The Takamori detachment on the morning of September 5th gave full play to its artillery in attacking Paoshan from the south, while the Asama detachment approached the western side of the town from the north. The newly-arrived Amaya detachment advanced north from the left wing of the Takamori detachment. At noon, the same day, the enemy was dislodged from Chinchatze. Toward evening, the Japanese captured the south-western corner of Paoshan, which the Japanese occupied completely at 11 o'clock on the morning of September 6th.

The Amaya detachment near Chouchiatze west of Paoshan inflicted a crushing blow on several hundred Chinese troops which fled from Paoshan. This detachment advanced to a line connecting Miaochiatze and Chouchiatze at 2:30 p.m., September 6th. The following morning, the detachment joined the Asama unit, thus establishing junction between the Japanese troops which landed at Woosung and those which landed on the upper estuary of the Yangtze.

The Amaya and Asama detachments pushed further west and advanced near Wangchiatze 2 kilometres east of Yuehouchen on the evening of September 7th. The following morning, they started an attack on the enemy near Yuehouchen and about noon advanced within 300 metres of the enemy position.

The Takamori detachment which reduced Paoshan continued its drive on the enemy which had been putting forth stiff resistance at Chinchatze west of Paoshan and also at Tsachiashang south of Paoshan. After dislodging the enemy from those positions, the detachment crossed Ssutang Creek and at noon, September 7th advanced to Chinchatze, about 3 kilometres west of Paoshan. At noon, September 8th, the detachment advanced to a line connecting Puchiatze and Chinchiachang about 2 kilometres west of Ssutang Creek where it immediately launched an attack on the enemy.

The Ishii and Kawanami detachments, assisted by artillery, launched an offensive against the enemy from the morning of September 7th. The Ishii detachment in cooperation with the Takamori detachment advanced to a line connecting Chenchiachang and Laoyangtze by noon, September 7th, and to a line connecting Chinchiachang and Shenchatze by noon, September 8th, while the Kawanami detachment advanced to a line connecting Tachiwan, Lushangpin and Tangchiachiao at noon, September 7th. The following morning, part of this detachment pushed further south and at noon, the same day, reached a line connecting Yuchiachiang and Lichiatze.

At 4 p.m., September 3rd, the Iida detachment together with artillery units landed at the International Settlement to dislodge the Chinese troops from Chunkung Road which leads from Shanghai to

Woosung, with a view to effecting junction between the Japanese troops at Woosung and the Japanese forces at the International Settlement. The detachment made preparations for the projected advance near the University of Shanghai on the night of September 5th. At six o'clock, the following morning, the Iida detachment started a drive northward. Assisted by the artillery of the Army and Navy and also by the naval air force, the detachment reached the Chiehpingshiang Creek at 11 o'clock despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy. To facilitate the drive of the Iida detachment, the Nakamura unit landed at the Jukong wharf in face of the enemy at 6 o'clock, the same morning, covered by both military and naval forces, and occupied a strategically important point on the Whampoo river. A detachment of the Japanese marines also advanced to the west side of Chunkung Road and reached Yangchiatze.

The Iida detachment crossed the Chiehpingshiang Creek at 4 p. m., September 6th and together with the Nakamura detachment made further advances. Toward evening, both detachments reached a line about 600 metres north of the creek. On the morning of September 8th, assisted by the military and naval artillery and also by the naval air force, the detachments resumed the offensive against the enemy. The Morihara unit, which formed the extreme left wing of the two detachments, took Shenchiaochiangchen about 1 kilometre west of Chunkung Road at 11 o'clock on the morning of September 8th, by dislodging the Chinese troops from their No. 1 and 2 *tochkas* near Chiehpingshiang Creek.

The Nagatsu and Wachi detachments which occupied the district near Lotienchen started a drive southward on September 11th and reached Lienchitang Creek on the same evening. The detachments then attacked the enemy which had established positions along the road from Yuehouchen to Lotienchen. On September 13th they effected junction with another Japanese detachment which had been advancing southward from Yuehouchen. On September 15th, the Nagatsu detachment advanced to Hochiatze north-west of Lotienchen, while the Wachi detachment proceeded to Machiao to the east of Lotienchen.

Meanwhile the Adachi and Asama detachments advanced to Wangchiatze 2 kilometres east of Yuehouchen on the evening of September 7th. The next morning, these detachments started an onslaught on the Chinese troops near Yuehouchen and succeeded in dislodging them from their positions at Yuehouchen and its surrounding districts at 2 p. m., September 10th. At 4 p. m., September 12th, the detachments advanced to a line connecting Tungchienchiao (about 3 kilometres west of Yuehouchen), Shenchiangtze and Sichangchia. The

following morning, the detachments pushed further, and at noon, September 13th, reached a point about 4 kilometres east of Lotienchen. On September 15th, the Asama detachment reached Chinchiatze, while the Adachi detachment advanced to Wuchiachiao, about 6 kilometres south-east of Lotienchen.

The Tagami and Ishii detachments attacked the Chinese troops along the line extending north and south from Yanghangchen for the two days of September 10th and 11th. The Ishii detachment, at 4 p.m., September 11th, succeeded in taking Choutsun, a strategically important point, which achievement enabled all the Japanese to advance within 200 metres of the enemy positions. Assisted by the bombardments of artillery and of the naval air force, the detachments at 10 a.m., September 12th, dislodged the Chinese troops from their positions and at 2 o'clock on the same afternoon reached a line extending north and south of Yenshihfang, about 3 kilometres west of Yanghangchen where they inaugurated an attack on the Chinese positions to the east of Kuchiatze. Under cover of artillery bombardments, the detachments on the morning of September 13th advanced within 500 metres of the enemy positions.

The Kawanami detachment, which dislodged the Chinese troops from the Shanghai-Woosung railway line, advanced to a line connecting Tangchiachiao, Yuchiachiang and Lichiatze at 2 p.m., September 10th.

The Morishige detachment which started a southward push from Woosung at noon, September 13th, along Chunkung Road dislodged the Chinese troops from their positions south of Shenchiaochiang and reached the University of Shanghai at 1 o'clock, the same afternoon, thus establishing junction between the Japanese troops at Woosung and the Morihara detachment which had advanced from the International Settlement northward along Chunkung Road.

The Morihara detachment, at 4 p.m., September 9th, occupied No. 4 *tobka* and made an onslaught on the enemy near Shenchiaochiang, after consolidating its positions along Chunkung Road. In cooperation with the Morihara detachment, Japanese Marines then advanced to the line between Chouchiatze and Yangchiatze. The Chinese troops in front of the Morihara detachment showed an indication of retreating in the direction of Kiangwanchen on the night of September 12th; the Morihara detachment gave timely chase to the enemy and the following noon, advanced to the Shanghai-Woosung railway line west of the Chinese Municipal Government building. The Japanese Marines which had occupied the Far Eastern Race Course advanced westward from the district south of Jukong Creek in concert with the drive of the Morihara detachment.

The Japanese reinforcements which joined the Kawanami and Morihara detachments from the rear launched an offensive on September 14th and reached a line connecting Luchiachiao, Kweichiatze (2 kilometres north-east of Kiangwanchen) and Chichiatze late in the afternoon. They continued their drive on the enemy positions north and east of Kiangwanchen until Chunkung Road was cleared of Chinese troops and the Far Eastern Race Course firmly secured by the Japanese.

The Japanese reinforcements which landed on the estuary of the Yangtze advanced on the region south-east of Liuochen after September 19th, thus strengthening the right wing of the Japanese positions and menacing the left wing of the Chinese troops.

With the arrival of reinforcements on September 21st, the Japanese forces along the entire Shanghai front, which had kept comparatively quiet, preparing for a general offensive, since September 15th, launched a general attack. Covered by artillery bombardments, the Japanese forces made a steady advance in spite of the heavy rain, pressing back the Chinese troops. The Japanese reached a line connecting Liuochen, Lotienchen, Liuchiahang and Kiangwanchen.

With regard to the Liuochen sector, the Japanese reinforcements which landed on the estuary of the Yangtze had finished concentration and were standing by on September 15th. On the morning of September 19th, they started operations and reached the line between Kaotze (4 kilometres south-east of Liuochen) and Wutze, whence they pushed further westward and occupied the line between Chutze and Chenchiatsun toward evening. On September 21st, in a heavy rain, the Japanese forces launched another general offensive and toward evening reached a line connecting Hsuanlutze (about 4 kilometres north-west of Lotienchen), Shentze and Chiangtze.

At the Lotienchen sector, the onslaught started by the left wing of the Japanese forces took steady effect, so that by the evening of September 15th, the Japanese had advanced to a line connecting Machiao (about 1 kilometre east of Lotienchen), Wuchiachiao and Hochiation. The following morning the Japanese resumed their westward drive, and on September 17th after severe fighting reached the line between Nantangkow (about 2 kilometres east of Lotienchen) and Machiatze (about 500 metres south-east of Nantangkow). The following evening the Japanese occupied the line between Nantsaotang (about 2 kilometres south-east of Lotienchen) and Wuchiatze.

The combined attack, both by land and air, started by the Japanese forces on September 20th, forced the Chinese forces to fall back further west. The following day, the Japanese occupied the line between Sunchiatze (800 metres south-east of Lotienchen) and

Chuchiatze.

At the Liuchiahang sector, the Tagami, Ishii, Takamori and Takeda detachments advanced to the line between Huoshaochang and Yangmuchiao on September 15th. The following day, they resumed their attack on the enemy positions at Chinchaiwan, Yangchiatze and Yangchiayen, which they occupied within the same day.

On September 19th when the long rain had stopped, the Japanese started a general offensive, assisted by artillery, and steadily approached the line between Liuchiahang and Wangwanfang.

The eastern front had been comparatively quiet for the two days preceding September 15th, but on that date the Japanese artillery force trained their guns on the Chinese positions at Kiangwanchen, where every shell fired took effect. The Japanese armoured cars were also active, while the Kawanami and Iida detachments steadily pressed on Kiangwanchen. The Morihara detachment along the Shanghai-Woosung railway, at dawn, September 15th, started a drive on the Chinese troops on the western side of the railway line.

The Sato and Takahashi detachments at the Liuhochen sector started operations on the region north of Lotienchen on the night of September 21st. The detachments dislodged the Chinese troops from their positions at Wangchiatze on September 25th and pushed further west. On September 27th, they occupied a line connecting Tutze, Huangtze, Shenchiaochiao, Yunghanchiao, Tanshihchiao, Peichintze and Wangchiatze.

The Japanese forces in the Lotienchen sector launched a general offensive at dawn, September 21st. Assisted by bombardments of the artillery and the naval air force, the Japanese infantry succeeded in steadily pressing back the Chinese after fierce fighting. And by September 29th, the right wing of the Japanese forces advanced to a line connecting Chinchiatze, Chenchiatze, Yuanchiatze and Lichiatze, while the left wing reached a line extending from Peichutze and Shenchiaochiao to Yuantze, Tientze and Sichientze. Thus, the Japanese succeeded in dislodging the Chinese troops from all the positions around Lotienchen.

In this connection, mention must be made of the "White-Walled House" south of Lotienchen, which harassed the Japanese troops.

The Wachi detachment operating in the Lotienchen sector failed to take the "White-Walled House" which resisted attacks for 26 days. Little wonder that the second offensive of the Wachi detachment was concentrated on the mystery house which stood south of Lotienchen, only 70 metres away from the Japanese first line! The house had white walls about 10 metres high and a circumference of about 100 metres. The walls had numerous crenels with scores of

machine-guns trained on the Japanese positions. Additionally, a creek about 4 metres wide ran between the Japanese positions and the "White-Walled House," thus hampering the advance of the Japanese forces.

The commander of the detachment decided to capture at all costs the mystery house on September 23rd, the Festival of the Autumnal Equinox. With artillery fire concentrated on the house at 2 p.m. as the signal, several Japanese armoured cars led the storming party which crossed the creek over which as a forlorn hope engineers had spanned a bridge.

The Japanese engineers since September 19th had been constructing an underground road from the Japanese positions to a point 35 metres from the "White-Walled House." A Japanese death-band crept through the underground road and dashed 20 metres to blow up the white walls which they did successfully.

The combined attacks by artillery, aeroplanes and armoured cars together with the storming party which dashed through the subterranean passage resulted in the obliteration of the "White-Walled House" and paved the way for the advance of the infantry which occupied the spot at 4:30 o'clock, the same afternoon, dealing a crushing blow to the enemy. The infantry further advanced and occupied the red-brick barracks behind the "White-Walled House," thus interrupting the highway to Shanghai.

The Tagami, Ishii, Takamori and Takeda detachments which had been attacking Liuchiahang, launched a combined onslaught on the enemy positions along the line between Liuchiahang and Wangwanfang on the morning of September 20th, assisted by the artillery and air force. By pressing back the enemy steadily, those detachments reached the line connecting Changchiachiao, Liuchiahang, Peishatze and Echiatze by September 30th.

In the engagement at this sector, reference must be made to the capture of the Chinese wireless station, which was effected by the Hosomi detachment in cooperation with the Ishii detachment after hand-to-hand fighting. The enemy which took up positions near the wireless station at Liuchiahang offered stubborn resistance to the Ishii detachment. At 2 p.m., September 22nd, part of the Hosomi detachment succeeded in occupying the enemy positions near Wangwanfang which had been extending strong support from the flank to the Chinese troops near the wireless station. From that date, hand grenade warfare lasted for ten days between the Japanese troops and the Chinese forces whose positions were only 20 metres apart. A valiant unit of the Hosomi detachment dashed against the crenels of the enemy positions when the Ishii detachment launched a general

attack and succeeded in taking the wireless station.

The Kano, Tsuda, Tanikawa and Fukui detachments started operations on the night of September 25th and concentrated in the rear of the left wing of the Japanese forces which had been attacking the Chinese positions near Liuchiahang. On September 28th, those detachments reached a line connecting Paochialung, Hsutze and Kiangchiatze.

At the Kiangwanchen sector, the Japanese forces occupied Tangchiatze, Luchiaku and Chuangchiaku on September 20th and also Changchiang (south-east of Futan University) and Wangchiatze.

The Japanese troops which had been operating in the regions south and east of Liuhochen steadily pressed the enemy and occupied the line connecting Hsuanlutze, Lichiatsun and Yangtze on October 3rd. They then advanced to the creek on the eastern side of Tungchenchiang.

The Asama, Adachi and Nagatsu detachments which had been operating in an area south of Lotienchen started a westward drive at dawn, October 2nd, and broke through the enemy positions on the western side of the highway to Shanghai. They kept up their drive, so that their right wing reached the line between Yangchiatsun and Chenchiatze on October 3rd and their left wing advanced to the line between Chiangchiatze and Chichiatsun the same day. They established junction with the newly-arrived reinforcements on the line between Chichiatsun and Wuchiachiao. A further advance enabled them to occupy the line connecting Peichoutze, Yuanchiatze, Peitze, Chentze, Suchiatze, Wannienchiao and Tangchiatze on October 4th.

The Isa and Shimomura detachments which formed the right wing of the Japanese forces at the Liuchiahang sector resumed their drive on the morning of October 2nd and succeeded in advancing 2 kilometres in one stretch, so that they reached the line between Lichiufang and Echiachiao at 4 o'clock, the same afternoon. The next day they followed up their drive and occupied the line connecting Nanmeitze, Laotze and Luchiatze. On October 4th, they advanced further and reached the line extending from Hsintze and Hsinmuchaio to Yangchiatze and Tsaichiachiang.

The Kawanami, Tagami and Ishii detachments formed the centre of the Japanese forces operating at the Liuchiahang sector.

The Kawanami detachment on October 2nd launched a southward push and at 4 o'clock, the same afternoon, reached a line extending west and east from Hsiehningchiao, 2 kilometres south of Liuchiahang.

The Tagami detachment on October 3rd resumed its southward

advance and reached Wangchiatze via Hsiaolutze. The Ishii detachment at 7 o'clock on the morning of October 3rd took Echiatze. The detachment crossed the Shanghai highway and at 4 o'clock, the same afternoon, captured Changchiatze. The following day, October 4th, part of the two detachments advanced to the Yuntaopin Creek, while the main body pushed to the west of Echiatze and reached the line connecting Wangchiatze, Wangchiang and Chaochiatze in cooperation with the Kawanami detachment.

The Fukui and Tsuda detachments, which formed the left wing of the Japanese forces operating in the Liuchiahang sector, dislodged the enemy from Chunghsingtze and Hsinchia on October 2nd. The following day, the detachments reached the Yuntaopin Creek. At dawn, October 6th, the detachments crossed the creek and advanced to the line connecting Lichiachiao, Changyentze and Tsaozze toward evening.

The Suiyuan and Shansi Front

(From September 1st to October 6th)

The Japanese troops which had been making a drive on Tatung in northern Shansi province along the Peking-Suiyuan Railway, occupied Huai'an at 3 p.m., September 1st and took Yungchiapu toward evening, the same day. On September 7th, the Japanese forces occupied Tienchen, 80 kilometres south-west of Kalgan, while another Japanese detachment operating in the northern area occupied Nanhaochien, about 70 kilometres west of Kalgan on September 6th.

The main body of the Japanese forces took Yangkao, about 50 kilometres north-east of Tatung, on September 8th. The vanguard of the Japanese troops which reduced Chulopu on September 11th kept up its advance and reached Tatung on the morning of September 13th, when the Chinese troops surrendered by hoisting the white flag. Tatung, a strategically important town in northern Shansi, was captured by the Japanese very easily. Part of the Japanese forces advanced further and reduced Huaijen on September 14th.

The Mongol troops operating against the Chinese forces which invaded Inner Mongolia made steady advances and routed the 2,000 Chinese troops at Shangyi, about 50 kilometres west of Changpei, on September 8th. The Chinese fled westward. The Mongol forces also defeated the Chinese troops at Tehua, which retreated in the direction of Shangtu.

The Senda detachment which pushed westward along the Peking-

Suiyuan Railway had to fight not only the Chinese troops which put up stiff resistance, but also snow and difficult mountain passes. At 1 p.m., September 17th, the detachment occupied Fengchen on the Peking-Suiyuan Railway. On September 20th, the detachment started a northward drive along the railway, and reduced Old Pingtichuan on the following day. In cooperation with the artillery, and assisted by the Mongol troops which had advanced from Hsialiuho the unit succeeded in capturing Pingtichuan on September 24th.

Meanwhile the Hasegawa detachment which had played, strategically, a most important role in the Japanese military operations since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict, was sweeping everything before it in its operations in northern Shansi province. At dawn, September 18th, this detachment after a few hours' vigorous fighting occupied Yuyu, a border town. Giving hot chase to the retreating enemy, the detachment on September 20th occupied Shahukow, a barrier in the Great Wall, thus cutting off the retreat of the Chinese troops in Suiyuan province toward Taiyuan, capital of Shansi province, along the Liangcheng highway which leads from Shahukow to Suiyuan via Liangcheng. The Japanese occupation of Shahukow forced the cavalry and motorcar units of the Chinese troops in Suiyuan province to flee in confusion toward Suiyuan city. The Hasegawa detachment advanced further and occupied Liangcheng on September 23rd.

The Mongol forces which reduced Shangtu on September 17th, pursued the Chinese troops which retreated in a south-western direction. They occupied Taolin on September 26th. The converging operations of the Japanese troops on three routes, with Suiyuan, capital of Suiyuan province as objective, compelled the Chinese troops to retreat toward that city.

The Japanese forces which had taken Hsuanhua and Huailai made a spectacular advance on the Weichow plain. On the evening of September 11th, they occupied Weichow, a strategically important town in southern Chahar province. They continued their southern drive and occupied Yangyuan on the afternoon of September 12th. After crossing the provincial border, they steadily pressed on Kwangling, an important town in the northeastern part of Shansi province.

The enemy at Kwangling, unable to withstand the severe attack of the Japanese troops, fled in western and southern directions shortly after 10 a.m., September 13th, hotly pursued by the Japanese forces. On the morning of September 16th, the Yamada detachment occupied Hunyuan and the Aihara detachment took Laiyuan, thereby driving away the Chinese troops from Chahar province.

The Nagano and Yamada detachments on September 19th started

their advance on Laiyuan which they reached the following evening. In cooperation with Japanese forces which were already on the spot, the detachments consolidated their positions and sent part of their strength to Futku and Paishihkow to guard against possible Chinese counter-attacks.

The Aihara and Oba detachments on September 20th dislodged Chinese troops about one brigade strong from an area south of Kwangling and near the southern border of Chahar province. The detachments then attacked the communist troops at Lingchiu, which they took the same evening. From September 24th they started a drive on enemy positions near Tayingchen from the east and north, and occupied them on the afternoon of September 30th.

The Japanese force which reached Yinghsien in northern Shansi province on September 24th succeeded in occupying Hanchih on September 29th, thrusting a powerful wedge into the Chinese positions in northern Shansi province. Another Japanese force which swooped down on northern Shansi from the north occupied Shohsien on September 28th, after driving away the Chinese cavalry. The Japanese force kept up its westward drive and subsequently occupied Ningwu. The Chinese positions in northern Shansi province, extending over 80 kilometres, were threatened with imminent collapse, since both wings were outflanked and because of the strong wedge thrust into their centre by the Japanese forces.

The Mongol troops which had taken Taolin kept up their westward drive and on September 29th occupied Wulanhua. A Mongol detachment on September 30th reduced Pailingmiao, a Mecca to the Mongols, and cut off the retreat of the Chinese troops toward the west. This action, together with the advance of the Japanese troops both by the Peking-Suiyuan Raiway via Pingtichuan and by the Liangcheng highway, rendered the position of the Chinese troops at Suiyuan, capital of Suiyuan province, absolutely hopeless.

The Japanese forces which swooped down on Shohsien in northern Shansi province from the north, as mentioned before, took Ningwu at 6 p.m., September 30th. They were pursuing the enemy toward Taiyuan, capital of the province. The Goto detachment, on September 28th after severe mountain fighting, occupied Juyuehkow, an important barrier in the Inner Great Wall between Pingchikwan and Yenmenkwan. This detachment continued its southern drive and at 7:30 p.m., September 29th, took Hanchih, thus dividing the 80,000 Chinese troops along the Inner Great Wall line, with the aid of the Japanese occupation of Tayingchen on the eastern front of Shansi province. The Goto and Ishikura detachments on September 30th reduced Taichow and forced the 80,000 Chinese troops along

the Great Wall in northern Shansi to retreat in a south-eastern direction. In this connection, it must be recalled that General Yen Hsi-shan, warlord of Shansi, spent over one million yuan in constructing fortifications at Hanchih which were taken by the Japanese forces on September 29th. The fall of Hanchih spelt the downfall of the enemy in northern Shansi.

The Goto and Ishikura detachments continued their southern drive on Taiyuan. After taking Kuohsien, these detachments pushed further southward. On October 6th, their vanguard occupied Yuanping, which, strategically, is most important in Shansi province, ranking next only to Taiyuan. General Yen Hsi-shan, has long wielded great influence over Chinese politics by advocating the principle of Shansi for Shansians, but the day is apparently very near, when he will be forced to flee from Taiyuan.

The Peking-Hankow Railway Front

(From September 6th to October 3rd)

The Kanda and Okamoto detachments, on September 6th, succeeded in dislodging the two divisions of the Chinese Central Government troops from Chienchuntai, a mountainous district on the upper reaches of the Yungting river, about 50 kilometres west of Peking. The enemy then fell back to the mountains west of Chienchuntai where they offered stubborn resistance. The Chinese, however, suffered severe losses through the violent onslaught kept up by the Japanese for about a week, and fled westward in confusion at 3 p.m., September 13th. This removed the menace to the Japanese troops in the Peking and Tientsin area from the west.

The Suzuki detachment on the night of September 11th dealt a crushing blow to the Chinese troops, about one regiment strong, which under cover of night launched a counter-attack in the southern area of Lianghsiang. On September 15th, the detachment occupied Fangshan. The following evening, the right wing of the Japanese forces advanced to the line between Choukowtien and Towtienchen and at dawn, September 17th, pressed back the Chinese troops commanded by General Sun Lien-chung between the Liuli river and Chochow. At 7 a.m., September 18th, the Japanese troops advanced to the western area of Chochow and at 2 o'clock, the same afternoon advanced to the line between Siting and Sunchiachuang on the right bank of the Chuma river, thus enabling the Japanese to take up a position enveloping Chochow and promising spectacular developments in the Japanese military operations along the Peking-Hankow

Railway.

The Sakanishi, Ishiguro and Morita detachments, which advanced to the line between Kwantun-chien and Sitsaochuang on September 15th, had to their credit the successful breaking through of the centre of the 60,000 Chinese troops under Generals Feng Chan-hai and Wan Fu-lin on the line between Kuan and Yungching. On September 16th, the three detachments successfully crossed the Chuma river, overcoming all obstacles, and continued their westward drive, by pressing back the Chinese troops.

At dawn, September 17th, these detachments converged at Sunglin-tien station on the Peking-Hankow Railway south of Chochow, which was thus threatened with combined attacks both from the north and south. The detachments, by crossing the Yungting and the Chuma rivers, now stood on the Peking-Hankow Railway track south of Chochow, which they succeeded in encircling by boldly breaking through the centre of the Chinese positions.

The Chinese Central Government troops under General Sun Lien-chung at Chochow were trapped by the Japanese forces which attacked them from Fangshan in the north and from Sunglin-tien in the south. The Chuma river which had defied the Japanese advance now appeared to be cutting off the retreat of the Chinese troops. The Japanese encircling movement was completed early on the morning of September 17th, which dawned on the Cholu plain ushering in a brilliant victory for the Japanese forces.

The left wing of the Japanese forces which occupied Niutzechen on the evening of September 15th continued its advance in heavy rain and on muddy roads the following day. At 7 p.m., September 18th, the Taching river near Hsinchiao was reached, thus strengthening and extending the Japanese enveloping movement.

The last but not the least important factor in the success of the encircling movement was the advance of the Yamada detachment on Laiyuan where it dominated Chochow across the mountainous region along the Great Wall, and also the successful operations of the Japanese forces along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway which by then had reached Tsangchow and were tightening the eastern end of the huge drag-net spread by the Japanese forces on the Cholu plain with Chochow as its centre.

It was the Japanese armoured car unit that took the lead in the attack on Chochow, by cutting the Peking-Hankow Railway at Sunglin-tien south of Chochow, thus cutting off the retreat of the Chinese troops.

Speculation was rife as to whether the Chinese troops at Chochow would fight against the Japanese to the bitter end or attempt a whole-

sale retreat.

About noon, September 18th, the Toyama detachment rushed to the front from the rear and launched a fierce onslaught on Chochow, which completely disarmed the opposition of the Chinese troops. Thus the Toyama detachment was the first to enter Chochow, from which the enemy fled in utter confusion toward Paoting.

Other Japanese forces started a southward drive in pursuit of the retreating Chinese, without entering Chochow.

Falling back on their intimate knowledge of geography and their traditional superiority in retreating tactics, the Chinese troops managed to escape the annihilation that was threatened by the Japanese encircling movement from three directions, north, south and east. The Chinese troops under General Sun Lien-chung fled to the mountainous region in the south-west, while those under General Feng Chan-hai fled in the direction of Ichow and those under General Wan Fu-lin toward Paoting. Yet in spite of this escape, an utter debacle overtook the Chinese forces, exceeding 100,000, which were routed by the Japanese troops, far inferior to them in numerical strength. The Chinese casualties in the Chochow battle are estimated to be more than 6,000. It may be also noted that the battle came to an end on September 18th, an anniversary of the outbreak of the Manchurian incident.

The Japanese forces steadily followed up their victory and on September 19th reached the line between Ichow and Tinghsing, and on September 20th, the line connecting Tanghuchen, Laotsun and Kuchengchen, in pursuit of the retreating Chinese.

On September 21st, the right wing of the Japanese forces reached the northern area of Tunglungmen and the central and the left wing advanced to the Tatse river, pursuing the enemy which was fleeing in the direction of Paoting.

The Sakanishi, Ishiguro and Morita detachments at dawn, September 23rd, reduced Nancheng and advanced on Paoting from the northwest. Early in the afternoon of the same day, the detachments reached the line connecting Ssupingchuang, Hanchiachuang and Fangshunchiao west of Paoting and interrupted the Peking-Hankow Railway, cutting off the retreat of the Chinese troops to Shichia-chuang, an important railway juncture.

The Okamoto, Hasegawa and Yasuda detachments which had been making a frontal attack on Paoting, the seat of the Provincial Government of Hopei, reached the line between Kuokuochuang and Changchuang at 9 a.m., September 23rd, after capturing the *tockas* near Peilou. Other Japanese detachments took a circuitous route in the east and advanced on Nantayüan, pressing on the eastern side of

Paoting.

The Japanese detachments, which had been attacking from the north, stormed the northern projection of the walled city of Paoting at 9:45 a.m., September 24th, covered by artillery fire. In face of severe Chinese trench-mortar and machine-gun fire, the Japanese troops crossed the 20-metre moat below the outer wall, and scaled the 15-metre inner wall, on the top of which they hoisted the Japanese flag. Shortly after 10 o'clock, the same morning, the Japanese firmly secured the north and west gates of Paoting. The fierce Japanese onslaught forced the Chinese troops to make full retreat. The retreating Chinese, however, had another enemy in the rear, in the form of the Desertion Prevention Corps, which ruthlessly fired on its fleeing compatriots. Consequently, disastrous fighting ensued between the Chinese themselves at various points.

Since the Peking-Hankow railway was cut off south of Paoting, the Chinese troops fled through the south gate of the city, the only safe outlet, toward the south either on foot or by motor-lorry. The roads leading to Paicheng and Changtien from Paoting were seething with Chinese troops fleeing from Paoting. After clearing Paoting of the remnants of the Chinese troops, the Japanese forces cut off the retreat of the enemy at Peikoutao and Hsiaochuchai, 8 kilometres south of Paoting, and dealt a crushing blow to the Chinese.

The main body of the Japanese forces, led by the Hasegawa detachment, made a triumphant entry into Paoting, the seat of the Provincial Government of Hopei and the base of the anti-Japanese operations in North China, at 2:40 p.m., September 24th. The fall of Paoting took place within a week of the collapse of Chochow.

The Japanese forces lost no time in following up their victory, by giving hot chase to the Chinese troops retreating in the southern and western directions.

The Kimura detachment occupied Hsinlo, 80 kilometres south of Paoting on September 25th. Meanwhile the Japanese military air force visited various strategically important points between the Peking Hankow and the Tientsin-Pukow railways, including Hochien, Hiunghsien and Fucheng and effectively bombed the Chinese troop concentrations and military establishments there.

The Japanese forces, after occupying Hsinlo on the Peking-Hankow Railway, stopped some time there to prepare for their southern drive and also to repair the railway bridge south of Hsinlo which had been damaged.

On October 3rd, the Japanese troops started a southern push from Hsinlo and occupied Tunganchen, whence they advanced further south to dislodge the Chinese troops from Shichiachuang, an im-

portant railway junction, from which a branch railway line, about 270 kilometres long, runs to Taiyuan, capital of Shansi province.

The Tientsin-Pukow Railway Front

(From September 4th to October 3rd)

The Akashiba detachment, which had been advancing along muddy roads on Tangkwantun and Machang on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, started a general offensive on Tangkwantun and Machang on the morning of September 4th.

The sky was overcast, rain was still falling. The Japanese military air force, flying extremely low, dropped bombs on the Chinese positions at Tangkwantun. The thuds of air bombings together with the booming of artillery fire shook air and ground. Covered by the artillery and air force, the Akashiba detachment captured Tangkwantun at 4 o'clock, the same afternoon. The fall of Tangkwantun presaged the fate of Machang, an important position on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

The Nakai detachment which had been operating on the western area of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway dislodged the Chinese troops from Tungtzeyaochen on the evening of September 3rd, and started a southern drive along the Tzeyao river.

The Japanese forces which occupied Tangkwantun at 4 p.m., September 4th, stopped some time there, preparing for a further drive. At dawn, September 10th, the forces launched an attack on the Chinese positions at Machang and its surrounding districts.

The Japanese vanguard dashed ahead through the flood, hip-deep. The situation developed favourably for the Imperial forces through close cooperation between infantry and artillery. The Japanese air force was also active, bombing Liuochen and Jenhochen, where the Chinese military barracks were situated, and inflicting heavy damage to the Chinese troops and military establishments.

At 11 a.m., September 10th, the Numada and Nagano detachments captured Liuochen, while at 4:30 o'clock, the same afternoon, the Akashiba detachment crossed the Machang river near Chientun in face of the enemy and occupied part of the Chinese positions at Machang.

Early in the following morning, the Japanese forces under cover of darkness stormed the Chinese positions. By 3 a.m., September 11th, the Japanese completely occupied Machang, from which the Chinese troops fled in confusion southward, leaving a large number of wounded and killed. The Numada, Nagano and Akashiba detachments

advancing through muddy waters, gave quick chase to the retreating Chinese forces and at 9 o'clock, the same morning, passed the line connecting Siweitsun with the southern extremity of Machang. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, they reached the line extending west and east from Lukwantun. The Akashiba detachment kept up its southern push and at 3:30 o'clock, the same afternoon, took Chinghsien, a strategically important town about 12 kilometres south of Machang. The Nakai detachment made a southern drive along the Tzeyao river, pressing back the Chinese troops, and on the morning of September 12th occupied Yaomatu, about 16 kilometres west of Tangkwantun, while the Numada and Nagano detachments at 4:20 p.m., September 13th, reduced Hsingchichen, about 10 kilometres south of Chingchow.

The Japanese forces, which had been preparing for a southwestern drive along the line between Tacheng and the Tzeyao river, launched a general offensive at dawn, September 22nd against the Chinese positions at Tacheng and Paiyangchiao, which are key points in the plain of northern Hopei province. The Japanese dashed through the marshy, muddy ground and took those two important points. Thus the Japanese forces operating along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway achieved a southern advance parallel to that made by those pushing south along the Peking-Hankow Railway.

The Numada, Nagano and Akashiba detachments, which took Hsingchow, 22 kilometres south of Machang on September 13th, kept up their southern drive on the line extending west and east from Yaokwantun station, which formed the first Chinese defence line for Tsangchow, covered by artillery.

About 2 p.m., September 21st, the Japanese forces launched a general offensive on Tsangchow in cooperation with the artillery and air force. The Japanese air force raided the Chinese positions at Tsangchow early in the morning of September 23rd and bombed the Chinese positions at Tunghuayüan and Sihuayüan, west of Yao-kwantun. The Japanese Akashiba detachment shortly after 9 a.m., September 22nd, succeeded in taking Tunghuayüan.

The combined, fierce attack by the Akashiba, Numada and Nagano detachments resulted in the successive capture of Yaokwantun and Malocheng, thus breaking the first line of defence of the enemy. At 5 p.m., September 23rd, the Japanese forces started a regular attack on the strongly fortified positions north of Tsangchow and at 6:30 o'clock, the same afternoon, succeeded in occupying Tsangchow. The Japanese forces followed up their victory and fiercely pursued the retreating Chinese. They took Chiehchih, about 8 kilometres south of Tsangchow at 10 a.m., September 25th.

The Japanese forces operating along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway maintained their southern drive. On the evening of September 28th, they occupied Hiunghsien and Paitaochen, while the Japanese left wing force on September 30th took Tungkwang, an important point on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway north of Tehchow.

The Japanese forces which kept up their southern push along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway crossed the border between Hopei and Shantung provinces on October 1st and occupied Sangyüan in north-western Shantung province. The same evening they reached a point 3 kilometres north of Tehchow which is 70 kilometres south-west of Tsangchow. The Japanese vanguard immediately started an attack on Tehchow. The offensive became general on the following morning, when the air force also participated. Meanwhile the main body of the Japanese forces succeeded in outflanking the Chinese positions at Tehchow without being noticed by the Chinese troops whose attention apparently was engrossed by the Japanese attack on the north-western projection of the Chinese positions.

The Chinese, therefore, were taken aback by the attack of the Japanese main body from the rear and flank, and were routed. The Chinese fled in confusion toward the south-west. The first serious engagement in Shantung province thus ended in a signal victory for the Japanese.

The Numada detachment made a triumphant entry into Tehchow at 11 o'clock on the morning of October 3rd.

II

FORCES OF THE IMPERIAL NAVY IN ACTION

PUBLICITY BUREAU, NAVY DEPARTMENT

A Summary of Naval Operations

On the Shanghai front, Chinese troops opened the morning of September 1st by directing machine-gun and rifle fire on North Szechwan Road and the headquarters of the Japanese Marines. The Japanese naval force smashed enemy positions by subjecting them to incessant gun fire.

September 2.—Japanese hydroplanes shot down four Chinese aeroplanes over Woosung. Japanese planes also bombed the Chenju Wireless Station, on September 1st and 2nd, destroying most of its equipment.

September 3.—Certain Japanese warships made their way into the harbour at Amoy and bombarded the Paishih battery, the air field, and the batteries at Hulishan and Tapankio, inflicting heavy damage on the enemy.

September 4.—In an aerial combat over Liuhochen with two enemy squadrons of three fighting planes each, two planes of the Japanese Naval air force shot down three of the opponents. At 3:00 p.m., another Japanese air force attacked the Chinese artillery position located at a point serving as a base for Chinese military operations which was adjacent to the districts guarded by British and American troops. The Japanese planes avoided flight over the Settlement and, after a daring low flight under extremely difficult conditions, bombed the enemy position on which they inflicted extensive damages.

In the afternoon of the same day, warships, in conjunction with an air force, twice bombarded severely the forts at Swabue and Makung; at 8:00 p.m., an aerial squadron bombed and damaged extensively military establishments at Haichow, the enemy's important strategic point at the terminus of the Lunghai Railway.

September 5.—In Shanghai, Japanese forces subjected the North District and Hongkew to concentrated fire and inflicted severe damage.

September 6.—In conjunction with army forces, a naval aerial force attacked the enemy on the Chunkung road. In South China a squadron of planes flew over Swatow and carried on extensive bombing of fortified areas causing considerable damage. Another squadron of

Japanese hydroplanes raided Amoy and destroyed the wireless station and the headquarters of the Constabulary.

September 7.—An air force bombed the enemy's air bases at Hangchow and Kwangtch, shot down six opposing planes, and returned safely to its base.

September 8.—In the Shanghai sector the enemy made several counter-attacks upon Imperial forces at Shakingkang in the north of the Settlement, but the Japanese Marines drove them back each time with heavy losses.

A squadron of the air force operating in cooperation with land forces smashed the enemy positions on the Chunkung Road and at other points, while a part of the squadron additionally bombed railway bridges and tracks, as well as vessels carrying military supplies at Kunshan and Sungkiang inflicting heavy damages on them all.

September 9.—A force of Marines advanced to the north-west of the University of Shanghai. An aerial squadron bombed the enemy's heavy artillery positions at Kiating, air bases at Hangchow and Changting and the Kiangnan Aircraft Factory. While in South China, the planes from the Japanese fleet bombed the building of the Department of Pacification Commission, the headquarters of the Constabulary and the Municipal Government building at Swatow, and later attacked and severely damaged the enemy's headquarters at Chungshan Park, the railway station and military barracks at Chaochow.

September 10.—The Yasuda unit of the Marines, under cover of an artillery and aerial bombardment, stormed and wrested from the enemy the positions to the west of the Chunkung Road. At noon, the Chinese artillery on the Pootung side made a wanton attack on the Japanese hospital ship, the *America Maru* which was anchored at the N.Y.K. pier by the Japanese Consulate-General. This attack resulted in several casualties on board the vessel. Countering the attack, Japanese warships soon silenced the enemy.

An aerial squadron bombed enemy positions in the neighbourhood of the Municipal Government building at Yuehpoochen and Yanghangchen.

September 11.—The enemy forces made counter-attacks against the position held by the Sato unit to the west of the University at 5:00 o'clock in the morning, and against the Marines at Patzuchiao in Chapei from midnight till dawn, but Japanese Naval forces shattered them and drove them back.

September 12.—A squadron of the air force bombed the enemy positions to the south of Lotienchen, and at Kiangwangchen, Tachangchen, Yanghangchen and the Municipal Government

building.

At 8:00 o'clock in the morning, Chinese airplanes bombed the Japanese hospital ship, the *Asahi Maru*, which was anchored in the Yangtze River, but fortunately there were no casualties. In South China a flotilla of destroyers bombarded the enemy forts at Paiya in Bias Bay, and simultaneously a unit of Marines was landed which destroyed two of the enemy's field guns and captured one. In this attack, the powder magazine at the fort caught fire and was completely destroyed by explosion. The same destroyer flotilla bombarded and demolished the Canton Naval Wireless Station at Pinghai at 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

September 13.—At the Shanghai front the Shibakita unit of the Marines captured the enemy position at the Far Eastern Race Course.

In the morning, one Japanese warship was attacked by two Northrop planes in the neighbourhood of Wanshan Islands to the southwest of Hongkong, but suffered no damage.

September 14.—In Shanghai the Furuta unit captured the Aikuo Women's School and subsequently the East Canton High School, both of which had been enemy bases.

A warship, with a destroyer flotilla, approached the fort at Humen and subjected the batteries there as well as two cruisers, which lay under the fort, to heavy bombardment. One of the cruisers heeled over and was forced aground with a large shell hole behind the bridge, while the other was also severely damaged and forced aground. The enemy batteries were of course silenced.

In the forenoon the same warship was attacked four times by Chinese planes. One of the bombs dropped by the enemy exploded in the water near the bow; splinters from the bomb wounded five of the crew, but the ship itself and its armaments suffered no damage.

September 15.—A destroyer was attacked by enemy planes five times successively in the forenoon, outside Swatow harbour. The Chinese dropped twenty-four bombs altogether, all of which missed their mark.

September 16.—An aerial squadron attacked the enemy's artillery positions and massed Chinese troops with annihilating effects. On the sea a warship on duty for interruption of traffic along the South China coast was fired at from the enemy batteries at Annankiang in the Hainan Straits. The ship fought back fiercely for a short while, dealing considerable damage to the enemy.

September 17.—A part of the enemy's air force bombed their own men who were retreating *en masse* toward the west of Lotienchen.

September 18.—Although this was the anniversary of the Sep-

tember 18th incident, the day was rather quiet, except for a night raid by several enemy planes, one of which was shot down in the Japanese counter-attack.

September 19.—An air squadron bombed the enemy forces at Kiao-sze and also bombarded the enemy's positions at Tachangchen and Nanhsiang and the air field at Changhing. A squadron of hydroplanes while reconnoitring various parts of Central China bombed the aerodrome and barracks at Haichow and completely destroyed three of the barracks. At Sūchow it bombed and smashed the engine shed and other equipment of the railway station.

September 20.—A unit of the air force bombed the Kwangtēh Air Field as well as enemy positions and other military establishments at Kiating, Tachangchen, and Soochow.

A large force of naval planes carried out raids on Sūchow and Lienyün-chiang; at the former place it destroyed military trains and an engine shed in the station compound; at the latter it bombed storehouses of military supplies and crude-oil tanks and set them on fire.

September 21.—A squadron of the air force raided the Kwangtēh Air Field, the Tsining Air Field, the railway station at Sūchow together with military supply trains, the air field and powder magazine at Hwaiyin, and also the Yenchow railway station.

A large air force raided Canton, where it engaged some fifteen enemy planes in aerial combat and downed eleven of them (two others appeared to fall to the ground but their fate could not be ascertained). In addition, it bombed the air fields at Tienho and Paiyün, destroying a hangar, barracks and six planes outside the hangar at the former air field, and two hangars and a fuel storehouse at the latter, besides bombing and destroying a part of the powder-mill at Tsengpu.

At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon another air raid was made on Canton. The Japanese air force fought in mid-air with about ten enemy fighting planes and shot down six of them; then forcing its way through the heavy fire of anti-aircraft guns, attacked the Tienho Air Field, destroying five hangars and a storehouse on the east side of the field. The squadron also carried on bombing operations against the Paiyün Air Field and destroyed a hangar and barracks, besides bombing to pieces five enemy planes of intermediate size which lay outside the hangar there. Throughout these operations the Japanese planes remained safe and the raiding party returned to its base intact.

September 22.—An air force raided the Tienho Air Field and the army headquarters, after which it bombed the Paiyün Air Field and

destroyed hangars and barracks as well as one aeroplane, besides inflicting considerable damage on three other planes which were on the ground. After this, the same air force made a raid on the air field at Tsunghwa and destroyed two hangars and a plane on the ground. In these operations one Japanese plane was lost after a gallant fight.

An aerial raid on Canton was once more carried out at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon with the following heavy damages inflicted on the enemy: At the Humen Air Field, 1 hangar was destroyed by bombs; at the Tienho Air Field, 2 hangars were destroyed by bombs and burned down; the munitions arsenal was destroyed; the Shektsing Arsenal collapsed; and a factory of military supplies was destroyed by bombs.

September 23.—An air squadron, taking advantage of darkness, raided Canton, and bombed the air fields at Paiyün and Tienho, the army headquarters and the military academy, following which it attacked Yenchow, and Nanchang causing substantial damage there. The squadron returned safely to its base.

September 24.—An air squadron flew the long distance to Hankow and Nanchang to make sudden raids on those places, where it caused the following heavy losses: At Hankow, the arsenal and the iron works were extensively damaged, and two enemy planes shot down in aerial fight; at Nanchang, both the old and the new air fields were bombed, a repair shop, barracks and several planes preparing for action were destroyed, while large fires started in several places.

September 25.—1. Air raids on Nanking: In the morning and afternoon four air raids were successively carried out by naval air units, which bombed the Department of War, the headquarters of the communications corps, the anti-aircraft batteries at Peichiko, and the wireless station.

2. Air raids on Canton: An air squadron raided the Canton area twice, bombing the Paiyün Aeronautical School, the Humen Air Field and the Military Academy, besides bombing and forcing aground an enemy gunboat at a point above Kishan.

3. Air attacks on enemy warships in the Kiangyin area: An air squadron bombed a cruiser of the Haitse class and a gunboat of the Yatsen class and forced both to run aground.

4. Two of the planes which raided Nanking met a heroic end there when shot down by enemy guns. Another plane made a forced landing near the Kiangyan fortress, but a member of its crew was saved by a companion plane.

September 26.—1. At noon a naval air force carried on bombing

operations on the following points on the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railway causing extensive damages to the following objects: At Kinhwa, railway tracks and several freight cars; at Chüchow, railway station, tracks, and a score or more freight cars; at Shangjao, an engine shed and several freight cars; at Kinkiang, railway tracks and several freight cars.

2. A part of the air force bombed and destroyed a Northrop plane awaiting action at the Kwangteh Air Field, and similarly damaged the aerodrome at Ningpo.

September 27.—1. Air raids on Nanking: A naval air force twice raided Nanking, bombing the Nanking Military Supply Works, the Pukow Railway Station and various points of military operations.

2. Air raids on Canton: A squadron attacked the Canton area three times during the forenoon and afternoon. In the first and second raids, it bombed important points on the Canton-Hankow Railway, inflicting specially heavy damage on a bridge south of Kongtsun and tracks near Yinchan Yao. In the third raid, this force severely bombed and damaged the Humen Air Field and barracks as well as a gunboat of the Haining class. In the first raid there was an aerial fight in which the Japanese force downed one of the enemy's fighting planes. Deep anxiety was felt for one Japanese aeroplane which was missing after the raids were over, but the plane was found by a British steamer off the coast of Amoy where it had made a forced landing, and the crew were saved and handed over to a Japanese destroyer.

3. Bombing of Kiating: A squadron of planes bombed and smashed the enemy positions on the southern outskirts of Kiating.

*September 28.—*The following important air raids were carried out: At Canton, main buildings of the Pakow Arsenal were bombed and burned; five hangars and barracks of the Tsungfa Air Field were bombed and destroyed. At Nanking, hangars at the Tachao Air Field were bombed. At Küyung, the air field and hangars were greatly damaged, two planes on the ground were destroyed and in an aerial fight one fighting plane of the Curtiss-Hawk type was shot down. At Wuhu, five planes were bombed and destroyed, and a fuel storehouse was fired; additionally, one fighting plane of the Curtiss-Hawk type was shot down in an aerial engagement. At Hangchow, the air field was bombed. At Kwangteh, hangars of the new air field as well as the Aeronautical School were severely damaged. At Súchow, the railway station, military freight cars, and storehouses of military supplies were bombed and destroyed. In the Shanghai area, the enemy's

main positions were bombed throughout the day in cooperation with land forces. Extensive damage was inflicted on the enemy there.

September 29.—1. A squadron of the air force swooped down on the Kwangteh Air Field in the grey of the morning and smashed a hangar and about ten storehouses there. Another squadron raided Kiangyin and bombed a cruiser until it heeled over.

2. In the forenoon naval aeroplanes bombed Hwaiyin where they destroyed two planes on the ground, and then raided Tsining, destroying an engine shed and barracks in the air field. In the afternoon they bombed the Sūchow East Station and destroyed storehouses of military supplies.

3. A unit of planes discovered an enemy cruiser near Canton, bombed her and caused a large fire on the ship.

September 30.—1. A squadron of planes raided the Nanhsiang, Kiangwanchen and Hangchow areas and inflicted damage on the enemy's military establishments and transport organs.

2. A squadron of aeroplanes bombed an enemy cruiser lying west of Hwangpu, and sank a gunboat in midstream off Tanchiang.

October 1.—1. An air force carried out bombing operations in the forenoon and afternoon with the following results :

At Nanchang, two hangars and main buildings were completely destroyed ; at Kwangsin, an engine shed was demolished ; at Pengpu, the railway station building was thoroughly damaged.

2. A squadron of planes bombed enemy warships at Kiangyin with the following results : 1 gunboat sunk, 1 gunboat hit in the side and forced to run aground.

3. A squadron of planes reconnoitring the Lunghai Railway bombed the enemy's barracks at Haichow with devastating effect.

4. At midnight enemy planes repeatedly appeared over the Japanese forces and dropped some fifteen bombs, but each time they were driven back without causing any loss to the Japanese side.

October 2.—1. An air squadron bombed Tachangchen, Miaohangchen, Kiangwanchen and other enemy bases in the forenoon and afternoon inflicting on them severe damage ; one Japanese plane was shot down.

2. A naval air squadron attacked enemy warships near Kiangyin with the following results : 1 cruiser was directly hit and stranded ; 1 gunboat was severely damaged and set on fire, another was broken in half, a third gunboat was damaged considerably.

3. A squadron raided Hwangpu and Canton and caused great losses there. On its return flight it encountered four enemy planes

of the Curtiss-Hawk III type. The Japanese squadron leader, engaging the entire enemy squadron in single combat, shot down one of the opposing planes.

4. At midnight enemy planes twice appeared to attack the Japanese force but were driven back each time.

October 3.—Important results of air raids were as follows : At Anking, two planes on the ground were bombed and destroyed ; a canvas-made hangar was damaged. At Nanhsiang, heavy damages were inflicted on military establishments ; railway tracks and 15 freight cars were destroyed. At Kunshan, a car-shed, three store-houses, a locomotive and freight cars were destroyed. At Kashing, a car-shed was destroyed ; a storehouse and railway tracks were considerably damaged. On the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, freight trains carrying defeated enemy forces from Hanchwang, Maotsunsi and Sanpaoyi were bombed and destroyed.

Japanese and Chinese Aircraft Losses

Material losses inflicted by the Imperial Navy on the Chinese air force within the period between August 14th and September 22nd may be summed up as follows :

	Aeroplanes		
	Definitely ascertained	Indefinitely Ascertained	Total
Shot down	152	5	157
Destroyed on the ground	120	7	127
Total	272	12	284

Against the above losses on the Chinese side, the Japanese Naval Air Force sustained loss of only 31 aeroplanes during the same period.

The Occupation of Pratas Island

On the morning of September 3rd, a Japanese warship visited Pratas Island, and sending ashore a party of Marines, occupied the island. A solitary island, lying 180 sea miles to the south-east of Hongkong, Pratas Island has a Chinese naval wireless station, meteorological observatory and lighthouse. The sea in its neighbourhood is noted for the production of a species of sea-weed, known in Japanese as "kaijinso," the extract of which is used for medicinal purposes.

LAWS RECENTLY PROMULGATED

PRIME MINISTER'S CABINET

Law Concerning Artificial Petroleum Manufacture

(Law No. 52, Promulgated on August 10, 1937)

Existing conditions in the supply and demand of liquid fuel render it of paramount importance, in the cause both of industry and national defence, to foster the growth of the manufacture of artificial petroleum on a firm basis, so as to make the supply of liquid fuel plentiful. Under the present Law all enterprises in this line are subject to a licence system in order to ensure their growth under the Government's planned control. The Government will, accordingly, undertake the supervision and direction of the industry to place business under a rational management. The effective date of the Law will be fixed by Imperial Ordinance.

Law Concerning the Teikoku Fuel Industry Company

(Law No. 53, Promulgated on August 10, 1937)

For rapid and well-controlled development in the artificial fuel industry is needed a considerable amount of capital, which, in turn, calls for adequate aid from the Government. The present Law provides for the establishment of the Teikoku Fuel Industry Company Limited with a capital of 100 million yen, of which 50 million yen is to be contributed by the Government. Additionally, the organization will be accorded certain special aids by the Government such as guaranty for payment of principal and interest of debentures and exemption from taxes. The Law came into force on September 18th.

Gold Production Law

(Law No. 59, Promulgated on August 11, 1937)

Law Annulling the Law Concerning Purchases of Gold by the Bank of Japan

(Law No. 62, Promulgated on August 11, 1937)

The Gold Production Law empowers the Government to make purchases of gold which have hitherto been entrusted to the Bank of Japan. It also prescribes the necessary measures for the development and supervision of the gold mining industry, and supersedes the Law Concerning Purchases of Gold by the Bank of Japan. Both the above Laws came into force on August 25th.

Law Concerning Valuation of Gold Reserves

(Law No. 60, Promulgated on August 11, 1937)

Law Concerning Gold Funds Special Account

(Law No. 61 Promulgated on August 1, 1937)

Notwithstanding the sharp advance in the world price of gold, gold reserves held against bank note issues have remained valued at the low price of one yen per 750 milligrammes or five yen per 1 momme, as fixed in the Coinage Act. It so happens, therefore, that the figures given out by the banks by no means represent exactly their actual holdings, which are fairly large. Accordingly, the specie holdings of the Bank of Japan have been revalued at a price more in keeping with the current world price, fixed at ¥1.00 per 290 milligrammes or ¥12.93 per 1 momme. The same revaluation has been prescribed in respect of the gold holdings of the Bank of Chosen and the Bank of Taiwan. The profits resulting from this revaluation will be entered in the new account to be called the Gold Funds Special Account. It is further provided that the funds belonging to this Account may be employed, up to the extent of 50 million yen, in accordance with the terms of the Budget, for the development of gold production, or for the acquisition of gold in order to replenish the foreign exchange fund, pursuant to the order of the Minister of Finance. In case there is any balance left of the stated sum, it may be invested in Government bonds. The incomes and outgoings of this fund are to be administered as an Account specially created separate from the General Accounts.

Both the above Laws came into force on August 25, 1937.

Law Amending the Law Concerning the Bank of Chosen

(Law No. 63, Promulgated on August 11th and Enforced since September 1, 1937)

This Law provides for the raising of the maximum limit of the fiduciary issue of Bank of Chosen notes from 50 million yen, fixed in 1908, to 100 million yen.

Law Amending the Law Concerning the Bank of Taiwan

(Law No. 64, Promulgated on August 11th and Enforced since September 1, 1937)

This Law provides for the inclusion of Bank of Japan notes in the reserves against payment of Bank of Taiwan notes. The maximum limit of the fiduciary issue of the Bank of Taiwan notes is raised from 20 million yen to 50 million yen.